Reading done on December 20 2017
"Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques"
- by Dr. Carsten Bockstette - December 2008
- George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies
- Occasional Paper Series No. 20
- ISSN 1863-6039
- photo source Bockstette 2008, 9
In the abstract of this paper, Dr. Carsten Bockstette claims that in order to counter the terrorism threat requires knowledge of what motivates, feeds and supports jihadist terrorists and their followers. He asserts that this paper looks how jihadists use strategic communication management techniques according to the elements used to generate a strategic communication management plan (see figure 1) (Bockstette 2008, 5). Dr. Bockstette (2008) states that the theoretical jihadist terrorist communication plan further described shows that jihadist groups emphasize on the development of comprehensive communication strategies to reach the desired short-term, mid-term, and long-term goals (5). With the careful analysis of their audience, they adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly with the communication goals aimed to legitimize, propagate, and intimidate (Bockstette 2008, 5).
“If one speaks about the art of war, one has to consider the following battle space dimensions: knowledge, strength, time and space, all in conjunction with ingenuity. Knowledge stands for high-quality, mission-relevant information that is readily available to one’s own side but is kept from the opponents, in order to guarantee qualitative knowledge superiority. Strength stands for quantity and quality of force in every dimension. Time refers to speed, endurance, timeliness, diligence, or a combination thereof. Space describes area, depth, sphere and society. Ingenuity conveys the astuteness of the leadership qualities, the use of unconventional actions and/or the refusal to follow conventions” (Bockstette 2008, 7).
For the purposes of this paper, Dr. Bocktette (2008) defines ‘terrorism’ “as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict[1] that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols)” through media exploitation in order to attain maximum publicity to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to achieve short-term, mid-term, or long-term goals (8). Moreover, the author, states that for the purposes of this paper, strategic communication management is defined as the systematic planning and achievement of information flow, communication, media development and image treatment with the long-term planning with the idea of conveying particular message(s) to the target audience(s) at the intended time (Bockstette 2008, 9).
For the purposes of this paper, Dr. Bocktette (2008) defines ‘terrorism’ “as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols)” through media exploitation in order to attain maximum publicity to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to achieve short-term, mid-term, or long-term goals (8).
Moreover, the author, states that for the purposes of this paper, strategic communication management is defined as the systematic planning and achievement of information flow, communication, media development and image treatment with the long-term planning with the idea of conveying particular message(s) to the target audience(s) at the intended time (Bockstette 2008, 9).
According to Bockstette (2008), terrorism through Jihad is not only motivated by the extreme interpretation of Islam (10) but also referring to EUROPOL (2007), Bockstette (2008) notes that the use of violence by its practitioners is regarded a religious duty (Bockstette 2008, 10). He goes on to assert that the jihadi goal is the revival the Islamic Ummah, which is the Muslim community of believers, to create the a world wide Islamic caliphate, which they consider as “the ideal Islamic form of government representing the political unity and leadership of the Muslim world” (Bockstette 2008, 10).
“In a 2006 interview, Abu Musab-al Zarqawi explained the jihadists’ goal thus: “Our political agenda, […] is that of the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him), I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour, until Allah is worshipped alone … this is what determines our political goal. We fight in the way of Allah, until the law of Allah is implemented, and the first step is to expel the enemy, then establish the Islamic state, then we set forth to conquer the lands of Muslims to return them back to us, then after that, we fight the kuffar (disbelievers) until they accept one of the three. I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour; this is our political agenda” (Jihad Unspun 2007)” (Bockstette 2008, 10).
Bockstette (2008) breaks down jihadi terrorist groups’ goals into 3 categories:
Short-term Political Goals
In this goal category, the jihadist terrorists aim to expand of their support and sympathizers (Bockstette 2008, 10). Therefore, according to Bockstette (2008), the persuasion of the existence of friction between Muslim identity and that of the West is crucial in the narrative to reach this goal (10).
“It thrives on images and words about every innocent civilian killed by Western bombs transmitted via television and Internet, producing intense antipathy towards the West” (Bockstette 2008, 10).
Intermediate Political Goals
The aim of this goal is the instalment of regimes supportive of the Islamic movement, and eventually transform the different regimes into one big state that leads to the long-term goal (Bockstette 2008, 11).
Long-term Political Goals
The jihadists’ primary long-term goal is to restore an Islamic caliphate by politically uniting all muslim countries worldwide (Bockstette 2008, 11).
Furthermore, Bockstette (2008) claims that the jihadi communication goals and their political goals go hand in hand (Bockstette 2008, 11). Moreover, he breaks down jihadi terrorist groups’ communication goals into 3 categories:
The first long-term strategic communication goal is to disseminate and expand their movement globally through the spreading of information among sympathizers (Bockstette 2008, 11). Bockstette (2008) claims that the intention of the terrorist communication strategy is to ultimately restructure ‘the political discourse and identity of the Islamic world” (Bockstette 2008, 12).
The second long-term strategy communication goal is the legitimization of their movement including their terroristic deeds even though violence and killing of innocent people contradicts Islam (Bockstette 2008, 12). The narrative of this communication goal is to demonstrate compliance with Islamic law (Bockstette 2008, 12). The legitimization of their movement is portrayed through: the utopia through the Islamic caliphate, the moral and religious justification, the deliverance of the muslim communities from the ruthless non-muslim enemies (Bockstette 2008, 12).
The third long-term strategy communication goal is the intimidation of the near enemy, composed of secular Muslim regimes, and the far enemy consisting of Jews, unbelievers, and Western societies (Bockstette 2008, 12).
The Communication Infrastructure
During the 1990s, terrorist organizations communicated with their audience(s) through more traditional means, such as journalist interviews, fax, face-to-face propaganda and press conferences (Bockstette 2008, 12). After September 11, 2001, and with the advancement of technology, jihadists developed their communication strategies exponentially with the amelioration and sophistication of the frequency, quality, style and techniques of media outputs (Bockstette 2008, 13). Bockstette (2008) claims that the media rhetoric is mostly focused on the visual component and new media has played a big role in allowing the spread of the jihadi message and their improvements (13).
Jihadist groups have adopted with open arms the advancements in communications technologies to maximize the psychological impact of their messages (Bockstette 2008, 14).
In the mid-1990s through late 2001, the jihadists’ organizational structure consisted from the following:
- A political committee, which is responsible for political relations and the jihadi movement in general (Bockstette 2008, 14).
- A military committee, which conducts the operations (Bockstette 2008, 14).
- An information committee, to transmit information to its public audience (Bockstette 2008, 14).
According to Bockstette (2008), the jihadist terrorists profit from the opportunity mass communication gives in terms of connection through inter-personal media such as mobile phones, iPods, WiFi, etc. and the World Wide Web allowing interpersonal communication and particularly allowing interactions such as uploading content; this has advanced the possibilities to connect with their target audience(s) - their sympathizers (15).
According to Bockstette (2008), the jihadist terrorists profit from the opportunity mass communication gives in terms of connection through inter-personal media such as mobile phones, iPods, WiFi, etc. and the World Wide Web allowing interpersonal communication and particularly allowing interactions such as uploading content; this has advanced the possibilities to connect with their target audience(s) - their sympathizers (15). Furthermore, Bockstette (2008) claims that jihadi groups use the internet for internal and external communication: for funding purposes, franchising the brand name, recruiting, operations, and retrieving information about potential active sympathizers to join or to fund (16).
Due to hacks or shutdowns by law enforcement agencies static jihadi websites declined, nevertheless, jihadi organizations began to turn towards online forums and blogs as a more secure way of disseminating their propaganda material, which are more difficult difficult to track and black due to its global spread (Bockstette 2008, 18).
[1] According to Dr. Bockstte (2008), these are conflicts between parties that show an imbalance in forces, a difference in determination, motivation, legitimization, application of methods, and/or quality or character of methods themselves (Bockstette 2008, 7-8).